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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






GLOBAL ENERGY CONSULTANTS, LLC, 




HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.;  
HOLTEC MANUFACTURING DIVISION, INC., 
         
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
         (D.C. Civ. No. 2:08-05827) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges  
 






GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Global Energy Consultants, LLC (“Global”) filed suit against Holtec 
International, Inc. and Holtec Manufacturing Division, Inc. (collectively, “Holtec”) 
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alleging that Holtec had breached the terms of its agreement with Global.  Specifically, 
Global alleged that Holtec had “circumvented” it by excluding Global from its dealings 
with certain business contracts despite a provision in the agreement prohibiting 
circumvention by either party.  The parties conducted discovery.  Global voluntarily 
dismissed its breach of oral contract claim and its breach of confidentiality provision 
claim.  Both parties sought summary judgment on the remaining claim—breach of the 
non-circumvention provision.  The District Court granted Holtec‟s motion for partial 
summary judgment.  Global filed a timely appeal. 
Because we agree with the District Court that “circumvent” is an indefinite term 
and that the non-circumvention provision is therefore unenforceable, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and therefore recount only the 
essential facts. 
In September 2001, Global approached Holtec about joining a team that Global 
was putting together to pursue European business opportunities related to spent nuclear 
fuel storage.  Before it would reveal the details of those projects, Global required Holtec 
to sign a “Confidentiality and Non-Circumventure Agreement” (the “Agreement”), which 
it did.  The two-page Agreement acknowledges that the course of business between the 
parties will involve the provision of non-public information by both parties and limits the 
circumstances in which that information can be disclosed to third parties.   
The paragraph at issue in this appeal states: 
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Each party acknowledges that Holtec and [Global] may be in similar 
businesses, and are not constrained by this Agreement with respect to other 
business activities except solely to the extent of the express prohibitions 
contained herein.  Each party further agrees to not circumvent the other 
party, or to circumvent the other party to the other party‟s clients without 
prior written authorization.  
(the “non-circumvention provision.”)  The Agreement also contains an integration clause 
and a provision stating that the Agreement is governed by Massachusetts law. 
After the Agreement was executed, Global informed Holtec that it was working on 
a plan to establish an international spent nuclear fuel storage facility, with particular 
interest from Lithuania, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.  This plan did not ultimately 
materialize, but Global pursued a number of opportunities with the team it had 
assembled.   
In 2003, Global coordinated meetings with the governmental authority overseeing 
nuclear power in Ukraine, Energoatom, and with a Swiss utility company, now known as 
NOK.  Holtec was involved in both meetings.  In February 2004, Holtec informed Global 
that it intended to pursue opportunities with both entities without Global‟s involvement.  
Holtec subsequently secured contracts with both entities, and Global received no 
commission on those contracts. 
Global filed suit in December 2008, alleging that, with these actions, Holtec 
circumvented it, thus breaching the terms of the Agreement.  Global sought a 
constructive trust on proceeds from the contracts as well as damages and a declaration 
concerning Global‟s interest in future contracts between Holtec and Energoatom and 
NOK.   
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Holtec sought partial summary judgment in four separate motions.  The District 
Court granted Holtec‟s motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the 
Agreement was unenforceable.  It found that the term “circumvent” in the non-
circumvention provision was indefinite.  Global voluntarily dismissed the remaining 
claims.  Hence, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Holtec.  Global filed a 
timely appeal. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
We review the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment de novo.  Azur 
v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. at 216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 
798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c))).1  
                                              
1  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The standard previously set forth in subsection 
(c) is now codified as subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is unchanged, 
except “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame] genuine „dispute.‟”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 





III.  ANALYSIS 
Global asks this Court to find that the non-circumvention provision was not 
indefinite and that the District Court‟s ruling was therefore in error.   
As the District Court noted, “[i]t is axiomatic that to create an enforceable 
contract, there must be agreement between the parties on the material terms of that 
contract.”  Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Mass. 2000).2  
Nonetheless, “[i]t is not required that all terms of the agreement be precisely specified.”  
Id.  In the seminal case on this subject, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
A contract is not to be struck down because one of its material provisions is 
stated in broad and general terms if, when applied to the transaction and 
construed in the light of the attending circumstances, the meaning to be 
attributed to it can be interpreted with reasonable certainty so that the rights 
and obligations of the parties can be fixed and determined. 
Cygan v. Megathlin, 96 N.E.2d 702, 703 (Mass. 1951).  Indeed, Massachusetts courts 
“construe the contract with reference to the situation of the parties when they made it and 
to the objects sought to be accomplished.”  Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 418 N.E.2d 597, 
600 (Mass. 1981) (citation and internal marks omitted).  Massachusetts is “slow to turn a 
plaintiff out of court for the reason that the promise given and relied on was so vague that 
it can be given no effect.  To have that result, indefiniteness must reach the point where 
construction becomes futile.”  Caggiano v. Marchegiano, 99 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Mass. 
1951) (citation and internal marks omitted).   
                                              
2 Based on the contract between the parties, we apply Massachusetts law.  
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 The District Court, considering this case law, found that the term “circumvent” 
was so indefinite as to render the Agreement unenforceable.  It noted that the Agreement 
provided no definition or examples of circumvention.  It further found that the term did 
not independently have a clear meaning.  Finally, it observed that Global itself had, 
during the course of the litigation, provided various and conflicting definitions of 
“circumvent”: while its discovery responses showed that Global believed 
communications with a third party in pursuit of European spent nuclear fuel options to be 
circumvention, when Holtec moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations 
grounds, Global‟s response asserted that direct contacts and negotiations could not be 
considered circumvention.   
 Global attempts to argue that circumvention has a clear meaning under 
Massachusetts law, but it concedes that no Massachusetts contract cases are reported 
construing the term.  Although Global provides citations to various Masschusetts cases 
defining or employing the term, in these cases, a regulation or legal rule provides a 
specific requirement that a litigant has allegedly circumvented.  See, e.g., Manousos v. 
Sarkis, 416 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Mass. 1981) (circumvention of rule of nonappealability); 
Little v. Rosenthal, 382 N.E.2d 1037 (Mass. 1978) (circumvention of medical malpractice 
screening tribunal); Commonwealth v. Bessette, 187 N.E.2d 810, 811 (Mass. 1963) 
(circumvention of regulated contract specifications).  No such specificity exists in the 
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Agreement,3 and none can be inferred from the context of the parties‟ relationship at the 
time that they entered the Agreement.   
The indefinite nature of the term, as used in the Agreement, is underscored by 
Global‟s changing position during the course of litigation.  See Allen & Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1052, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that existence of 
multiple definitions of contract phrase “underscore[s] that the agreement alleged by 
plaintiff, the enforceability of which plaintiff has the burden of proving, is indefinite”).  
During most of discovery, Global suggested that any communications with a third party 
in pursuit of European spent nuclear fuel options would constitute circumvention and 
therefore violate the Agreement.  Later, in order to avoid Holtec‟s statute of limitations 
defense, it suggested that Holtec‟s initial contacts with third parties did not constitute 
circumvention.  While Global is correct that the statements of its president during 
deposition are not admissible as legal conclusions, its briefing and interrogatory 
responses also asserted that discussion and communication with third parties, prior to the 
signing of any contracts, constitute circumvention.  That changed once the statute of 
limitations issue was raised.   
                                              
3 This absence of specificity distinguishes the non-circumvention provision at issue here 
from those that Appellant relies on in Cura Fin. Servs. v. Elec. Payment Exch., Inc., No. 
18278, 2001 WL 1334188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2001) and Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo 
Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1990), each of which provided more detail 
as to what actions would constitute circumvention.  The provision here, devoid of any 
specific referent, is more akin to that discussed in Consumer Incentive Servs. v. 
Memberworks Inc., No. CV990362655, 2003 WL 23025623 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 
2003), which the Connecticut Superior Court found to be too ambiguous to be 
enforceable.   
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These facts highlight the degree to which no precise definition of circumvention is 
obvious from the face of the Agreement or from the course of dealings between the 
parties, thereby rendering the non-circumvention provision unenforceable. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the orders of the District Court. 
